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Abstract
We analyze close elections between male and female mayoral candidates in Brazilian
municipalities to provide novel evidence on the role of women as policymakers. Using
an objective measure of corruption based on random government audits, we find that
female mayors are less likely to engage in corruption compared to male mayors. We
also find that female mayors hire fewer temporary public employees than male mayors
during the electoral year and tend to attract less campaign contributions when running
for reelection. Moreover, our results show that female mayors have a lower reelection
probability than male mayors. We interpret our findings as suggesting that male incum-
bents are more likely to engage in strategic behaviour and this improves their electoral
performance. Other explanations receive less support from the data.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we provide new evidence on the role of women as policymakers. In partic-
ular, we focus on close elections between male and female mayoral candidates in Brazilian
municipalities to analyze whether the gender of the policymaker affects corruption.
In recent years, a great deal of attention in economics has focused on understanding the
role of women as policymakers. Several empirical studies find evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that the gender of the policymaker affects policy decisions and outcomes (see,
among many others, Edlund and Pande, 2001; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Schwindt-
Bayer, 2006; Pino, 2011). Several experimental studies suggest that the choices women
make once in power may be more socially oriented than those of men (Eckel and Grossman,
2000; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Song, Cadsby and Morris, 2004). Consistent with this
experimental evidence, female representation in political leadership positions is associated
with less corruption and bribe-taking, as measured using survey data (Swamy et al., 2001;
Dollar et al., 2001; Beaman et al., 2009).
We contribute to this literature by providing novel evidence on the causal effect of the
gender of the policymaker on corruption in the municipal administration using an regression
discontinuity (RD) design. Instead of relying on survey measures of corruption, we use an
objective measure of irregularities in government contracts and purchases based on random
audits of local administrations. We find that female mayors are less likely to be involved in
administrative irregularities. We also analyze gender differences along two other dimensions
that may also be related to corrupt practices at the local level, which have not been explored
before in the gender literature.1 First, we analyze employment in the municipal administra-
tion, which can provide some insights about the use of patronage. We find that male mayors
tend to hire more temporary public employees during the electoral year, which is a standard
way to engage in patronage in Latin America (Kemahlioglu, 2013). Second, we analyze gen-
1The term corruption is typically used to refer to a broad range of activities, beyond bribe-taking.
Several definitions of corruption exit in the literature. According to a widely-cited definition by Nye (1967)
corruption can be defined as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against
the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.” World Bank (1997) defines corruption as the
abuse of public office for private gain. Public office can be abused for private gain not only by taking bribes,
but also through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets, the diversion of state revenues, and by
using public resources to advance the causes of private (special interest) groups.
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der differences in terms of campaign contributions. Political donations may allow private
interests to gain influence over elected officials (Strauss, 1999; Ansolabehere, 2007) and the
empirical evidence from Brazil shows that firms that contribute to the campaigns of winning
candidates experience significant increases in government contracts (Boas et al., 2014). We
find that women receive fewer campaign contributions than men, potentially consistent with
our corruption results.
In addition, we also analzye reelection outcomes. We find that female mayors are less
likely to be reelected compared to their male counterparts. We interpret our findings as
showing that, despite being more corrupt, male mayors are more likely to be reelected due
to their involvement in patronage and their ability to attract more campaign donations. We
provide evidence that is inconsistent with some of the alternative explanations.
The main goal of the paper is to provide novel rigorous evidence about how the gender
of the policymaker affects corruption. We rely on an objective measure of irregularities in
government contracts and purchases, which comes from administrative data from a federal
anti-corruption program in Brazil. Starting in 2003, the federal government began to ran-
domly audit municipalities to detect administrative irregularities in government contracts
and purchases. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper that links the gender of
the policymaker to objective data on irregularities in government contracts and purchases,
instead of relying on survey measures as the extant literature. We find that the probability
of observing a corruption episode is between 29 and 35 percent lower in municipalities with
female mayors than in those with male mayors.
To analyze patronage, we focus on temporary employment in the local public administra-
tion. According to research in political science, this is the standard tool through which mayors
engage in political patronage to gain reelection (Ames, 1995; Weyland, 1996; Engerman and
Sokoloff, 2002; Mainwaring, 2002). Weingrod (1968) defines patronage as “the way in which
party politicians distribute public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support.”
Our measure of temporary employment includes all non-permanent employees working in the
municipal administration, including commissioned positions (cargos comissionados), which
are positions directly appointed by the mayor without clear predefined criteria or require-
ments. We find that male mayors hire more temporary employees to work in the municipal
administration than female mayors (both in absolute terms and as a fraction of total employ-
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ees). These temporary hires are concentrated in the electoral year, consistent with the idea
that male mayors may increase temporary employment close to the elections to improve their
electoral chances (Kemahlioglu, 2013). Permanent employees have to pass a civil service en-
trance exam and cannot be easily dismissed by the mayor, as they have de jure job stability.
Given these restrictions, it is harder for mayors to use permanent employment as a tool for
patronage. Robinson and Verdier (2013) argue that political commitment problems explain
why patronage takes the form of employment in the public sector. A key issue in this regard
is that jobs must be reversible (e.g., the politician should be able to replace workers), so that
they tie the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician.
Consistent with this, we find no gender differences in terms of permanent public employees
in the municipal administration.
We also analyze campaign contributions, as political donations are considered to be one of
the main ways through which private interests gain influence over elected officials. The main
objective of campaign finance regulations is in fact to prevent political corruption (Strauss,
1999; Ansolabehere, 2007).2 Several papers suggest that in Brazil, political campaign financ-
ing is a crucial mechanism through which firms establish political connections. Corporations
can make cash donations to candidates or party campaign funds, with a maximum of two
percent of their previous year’s gross revenues, although off-the-books contributions are also
quite common.3 Empirical studies have found a significant relation between corporate cam-
paign donations and firm profitability, access to financing, and the probability of receiving
government procurement contracts (Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon, 2005; Claessens et al.,
2008; and Boas et al., 2014). We find that female mayors that run for reelection receive fewer
campaign contributions than male mayors running for reelection.4 This may be consistent
with our corruption results, to the extent that male mayors may be more likely to manipulate
government procurement processes to favor firms that donated to their campaigns.
When analyzing electoral outcomes, we find that female mayors who are eligible to re-run
have about 20 percentage points lower probability of being reelected compared to their male
2In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) the U.S. Supreme Court considered the undue
access to officeholders by campaign donors to be a form of corruption.
3In 2015 the Brazilian Supreme Court banned corporate campaign contributions, amid a corruption
scandal (The Wall Street Journal, 2015).
4We can only observe campaign donations for those mayors that choose to run for reelection. As mentioned
below, we find no gender difference in the probability of re-running.
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counterparts.5 We also find that there is no gender difference in the probability of re-running.
Overall, we interpret our findings as showing that, despite being more corrupt, male mayors
are more likely to be reelected due to their involvement in patronage and their ability to
attract more campaign donations.
Providing conclusive evidence on the link between patronage, campaign donations, and
reelection strategies is tricky, because the gender of the policymaker may affect many policies,
some of which are potentially unobservable.6 To provide more evidence in line with this
interpretation, we consider and rule out alternative explanations. One potential alternative
explanation for our reelection finding is that, despite being more corrupt, male mayors may
be doing better than female mayors in some policies or may provide more public goods, and
this explains their higher reelection probability. However, the great majority of evidence
from other countries supports the view that female politicians do a better job than male
politicians in providing public goods.7 Whether similar results hold in the Brazilian context
is an empirical question.
To analyze this alternative mechanism, we study differences across genders in the ability
to attract intergovernmental transfers and in the provision of key public goods that depend
on the municipal administration: health and education. First, we look at total discretionary
transfers for capital investment. In Brazil, the effort of the mayor is one of the main deter-
minants of the amount of these transfers. Second, we analyze health outcomes, focusing in
particular on health care services related to prenatal care delivery.8 We focus on prenatal
5One concern when studying reelection is that the decision to re-run may be endogenous. To overcome
this concern, we define our reelection measure considering all non-term limited mayors, who are therefore
eligible for reelection, irrespective of whether they actually re-run or not.
6In unreported tests, we analyzed the relation between patronage (proxied, alternatively, by the number
and the fraction of temporary employees working in the public administration in the election year) and the
probability of reelection, and found a positive and statistically significant correlation. We also found that
incumbent mayors that receive more campaign contributions (as a fraction of total campaign contributions
in a given mayoral race) have a higher probability of reelection.
7For instance, Anzia and Berry (2011) show that female members of the U.S. Congress secure more funds
from federal and state discretionary programs for their districts. Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014) show
that in places ruled by female politicians prenatal care is better and infant mortality is lower. Clots-Figueras
(2012) analyzes Indian data and shows that higher female political representation increases the probability
that a citizen will attain primary education in urban areas (but not in rural areas). Casaburi and Troiano
(2015) find that Italian female mayors are less likely to crack down on tax evasion compared to their male
counterparts.
8The public health system in Brazil is decentralized, spending is mostly financed by the federal gov-
ernment, but municipalities are responsible for all decisions regarding resource allocation. Thus, municipal
policies are a relevant determinant of health outcomes.
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care outcomes because, to the best of our knowledge, these are the only health outcomes
readily available at the municipal level and the evidence suggests that they tend to respond
quickly to changes in policies (Fujiwara, 2015). Additionally, we focus on educational inputs
for which data at the local level are readily available: the fraction of schools in a municipal-
ity that have certain facilities (library, science lab, and internet). Our results show that, if
anything, women do a better job at attracting transfers and providing public goods. First,
we find that female mayors attract about 60 percent more transfers for capital investment
than their male counterparts. Second, our results show that having a female mayor seems to
lead to better health outcomes related to prenatal care delivery. Third, female mayors seem
more likely to head municipalities with better educational facilities, although the differences
are small and statistically insignificant. This suggests that gender differences in the quality
and quantity of public goods are unlikely to offer an alternative explanation to why men are
more likely to be reelected.
Another potential alternative explanation for our findings is that men and women face
different electoral opponents when they run for reelection. This may happen, for instance,
if, after a mixed gender close election, the electoral strength of the incumbent is perceived to
be gender dependent. For instance, female incumbents may be considered weaker, and thus
they may attract more opponents or different opponents. We look at whether the number
and education of opponents to female incumbents differ from those of the opponents of male
incumbents. Our results are inconsistent with the importance of such a channel.
A key empirical challenge to identify the effect of the gender of the mayor on policy
outcomes is that there may be municipality-specific factors that are correlated with both the
gender of the mayor and policy outcomes. To control for municipality-specific confounding
factors, we adopt a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) in mixed gender close electoral
races. In this set-up, identification comes from comparing municipalities where a female
candidate barely won an election against a male candidate with municipalities where the
opposite occurred.9 Although this estimation strategy controls for municipality unobservable
9Several recent papers argue that the assumptions of RDD may be violated in recent U.S. House of
Representatives elections (Snyder, 2005; Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; and Grimmer et al., 2012). However,
Eggers et al. (2013) analyze elections around the world and find no other example of elections that violate
the RDD assumptions. The richness of our dataset allows us to show that a wide array of pre-determined
covariates are similar between municipalities where a female candidate barely won an election against a male
candidate and municipalities where the opposite occurred, supporting the validity of our research design in
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factors, it does not account for individual characteristics of the mayor. This could raise some
concerns if male and female mayors differ in terms of individual characteristics that are
relevant for policymaking.10 To alleviate this concern, common in the gender literature, we
show that female and male mayors elected following close races are similar in terms of a wide
range of observable characteristics, including education, political affiliation, and political
experience.
There is a large literature, summarized in Duflo (2012) and Doepke, Tertilt and Voena
(2012), studying gender and politics. We contribute to this literature by studying whether
the gender of the policymaker affects corruption. As mentioned above, several papers have
used survey data to look at the relationship between gender and corruption. Swamy et al.
(2001) find that women are less likely to pay bribes and to condone bribery. Dollar et al.
(2001) show that corruption is less severe in countries where women constitute a majority
of parliamentary seats, senior positions in the government bureaucracy, and the labor force.
Beaman et al. (2009) find that in villages with gender quotas villagers report paying less
bribes. However, all these papers rely on survey-based measures of corruption, which typi-
cally lead to biased estimates (Kraay and Murrell, 2015). We address this limitation of the
literature by using an objective measure of corruption based on random audits of municipal
governments. Also, while most of the evidence documents a correlation between gender and
corruption, we identify the causal effect of the gender of the policymaker on corruption by
using an RD design. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence on
gender differences in political patronage and campaign contributions. Moreover, we present
novel evidence on gender differences in reelection outcomes in developing countries. Ferreira
and Gyourko (2014) study the relationship between the gender of the policymaker and reelec-
tion outcomes for mayors in the U.S. In contrast to our findings, they find that female mayors
are more likely to be reelected and they don’t find differences in the observable policies that
male and female politicians implement.
the Brazilian setting.
10One plausible concern in our setting is that women that select into a close election against a man may
be of better quality than the male politicians who end up in a close election against a woman. First, although
the average quality of a politician is an unobserved variable, we find that the average candidates’ education,
a variable that is plausibly correlated with quality (Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2011), is balanced
in close mixed gender election. Second, even if some unobservable quality measures were unbalanced, if the
argument above holds, then female mayors should be more, and not less, likely to be reelected if voters value
positively politician’s quality and punish bad administrators (Ferraz and Finan, 2008).
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Brazilian institutional framework
and our data sources. Section 3 lays out our identification and estimation strategy. Section
4 discusses the empirical results and validity tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutions and Data
Our analysis focuses on municipal administrations in Brazil. Brazilian municipalities are
minor federative units with an autonomous local government, ruled by a mayor, directly
elected by citizens to a four-year mandate, and a legislative body, also directly elected by
voters. Mayors of municipalities above 200,000 voters are directly elected by a majority runoff
rule, while mayors of municipalities below 200,000 voters are directly elected with plurality
rule.11 Before 1998 mayors could not run for reelection, but since 1998, they are allowed to
run for a second term. In our study we focus on two municipal administration mandates
in municipalities below 200,000 voters: 2001-2004 and 2005-2008. Electoral data come from
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Superior Electoral Court), which is the highest judicial body of
the Brazilian Electoral Justice. Data on mayoral characteristics, including gender, education,
political affiliation, and political experience also come from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. For
our analyses, we focus on races with two candidates where one candidate is a woman and
the other is a man, which gives us a sample of 723 races.
Data on corruption come from random audits of municipal governments. Since 2003,
as part of a major anti-corruption program launched by the Brazilian federal government,
municipalities have been randomly chosen through a lottery to be audited. Auditors are
sent to the selected municipalities to examine the local use of federal transfers. For each
municipality, the auditors collect documents and information starting in 2001 and prepare
an audit report. To date, over 1,600 municipalities have been audited.
The corruption data from audit reports are coded by Brollo et al. (2013).12 The main
categories of irregularities described in the audit reports are: 1) illegal procurement practices,
which occur when one of the following is reported: a) competition has been limited, b) bid
value has been manipulated, c) an irregular firm wins the bid process, d) the minimum number
11See Fujiwara (2011) for an analysis of the effects of this electoral rule in Brazilian municipalities.
12Similar measures of corruption are used by Ferraz and Finan (2008), Brollo (2011) and Ferraz and Finan
(2011)
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of bids is not attained, or e) the required procurement procedure is not executed; 2) fraud ; 3)
over-invoicing, occurring when there is evidence that public goods or services are purchased
for a value above the market price; and 4) diversion of funds. Following the literature (see, for
instance, Brollo et al., 2013) we measure corruption using a dummy variable that indicates
whether at least one episode of any of the types of irregularities described above is detected
by auditors. We extend the data of Brollo et al. (2013) and include data from the first
thirty-three lotteries, which were conducted between May 2003 and July 2010. Corruption
data are available for 161 races in our sample.
Data on the number of public employees in the municipal administration come from the
survey Perfil dos Municipios Brasileiros (Brazilian Municipalities Profile) conducted by the
national statistics office IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat´ıstica, Brazilian Geo-
graphic and Statistics Institute). Detailed data on municipal employment are only available
for 2005 and 2008, thus we only have data for the first and last year of the mayoral term
2005-2008. We distinguish between permanent and temporary employees of the municipal
administration. Permanent employees have to pass the civil service exams and have de jure
job stability. Temporary employees include all non-permanent employees working in the
municipal administration, including commissioned positions (cargos comissionados), which
are positions directly appointed by the mayor without clear predefined criteria or require-
ments. Data are not available before 2005, so we cannot verify that our treatment and control
group have similar fractions of temporary public employees before the start of the 2005-2008
mayoral term.13
Data on campaign contributions come from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Candidates are
required to disclose all donors to the electoral authorities, who then release data on election
finances for each candidate. For each mayor in our sample that runs for reelection, we consider
the total campaign contributions received.
As mentioned above, we also analyze differences across genders in the ability to attract
intergovernmental transfers and in the provision of key public goods that depend on the mu-
nicipal administration: health and education. Most Brazilian municipalities rely on state and
federal transfers as their main revenue sources, with federal transfers accounting on average
13To alleviate the concerns arising from this limitation, we verified that many pre-determined covariates
are balanced across treatment and control group, as discussed below.
8
for 65 percent of the municipal budget. We focus on total discretionary transfers for capital
investments (CONVENIO agreements) from federal and state governments. These transfers
account about 40 percent of total municipal capital investment in all sectors, with the bulk
being accounted for by transfers from the federal government.14 Mayors have a significant
effect on the allocation of these transfers, as the local administration has to apply for them.15
Data on transfers for capital investment are self-reported by municipal administrations and
are obtained from the Brazilian National Treasury Website (Tesouro Nacional) –FINBRA
dataset.16
One of the most important characteristics of the public health system in Brazil is de-
centralization. Spending is mostly financed by the federal government, but municipalities
are responsible for all decisions regarding resource allocation (Collins et al., 2000). To ana-
lyze health outcomes, we use data from the Information System on Live Births (SINASC).
This system is managed by the Secretariat of Health Surveillance, in conjunction with state
and municipal health departments. Each state health department collects data on live birth
certificates in healthcare facilities and on the registries (for home births) and inputs all the
information into the SINASC. The Ministry of Health then assembles the data. This dataset
contains monthly information on number of prenatal medical visits and on period of preg-
nancy (weeks). The variables we use for our analysis are the share of pregnant women that
received at least one prenatal medical visit and the fraction of births that are considered as
non premature (at least 37 weeks).
Local governments are one of the main providers of primary education in Brazil (Souza,
2003). Brazilian states and municipalities are mandated by the Constitution to spend at
14In unreported robustness tests, we analyzed state and federal discretionary transfers for capital invest-
ments separately and found that the differences we find between female and male mayors are driven by federal
transfers.
15Discretionary transfers require an agreement between the municipal administration and the state or
federal government. Most transfers must be incorporated into the budget law by the (national or state) legis-
lature through budgetary amendments; therefore, support from deputies is very important. If the budgetary
amendments receive legislative approval, then the executive power (i.e., the president or state governor) can
decide whether to execute them (i.e., send the money to the municipality) or not.
16The variable used in the first part of the analysis is the log of total amount of the per capita transfers
for capital investment. We choose the log specification given the skewness of the transfers received by the
municipalities. Municipalities that do not receive transfers for capital investment are not dropped when we
run the log specification. For the log transformation we considered a reported amount of R$ 1,00, then,
the log amount is zero. All budget variables are in real terms at 2006 prices. Alternatively, we estimated a
Poisson regression considering as an outcome per capita transfers, and obtained similar results.
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least 25 percent of their total revenues (including federal transfers) on education. To analyze
education outcomes, we use annual data for the period 2001-2008 from the school census
(Censo Escolar) conducted by the Ministry of Education. Our education outcomes at the
municipality level are related to the physical infrastructure used for education, as this is the
only information available at the local level for all of our sample period. Specifically, we
analyze the share of schools in a municipality with internet, science labs, and libraries.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Identification: Regression Discontinuity
Identifying the effects of the gender of the policymaker on policy outcomes is a daunting
task.17 A comparison between municipalities with a female mayor and those with a male
mayor will probably generate biased estimates due to endogeneity issues. For instance, pol-
icy decisions might be correlated with municipality-specific characteristics such as attitudes
towards women or demographic characteristics, all of which could also influence the gender
of the local mayor. Define τi,t(1) as the potential outcome of municipality i if the mayor is
a woman, and τi,t(0) as the potential outcome of the same municipality if the mayor is a
man, in a specific time period t.18 We are interested in estimating the difference in potential
outcome in mixed-gender race, i.e. E(τi,t(1)− τi,t(0)|i ∈ Ω). The problem of causal inference
is that, at a given point in time, we cannot observe both potential outcomes. That is, it is
impossible to know the policies a city that has a female mayor would have adopted with a
male mayor. The intuition of our identification strategy is that cities in which a woman won
against a man by a narrow margin can be a good counterfactual for those places in which
the opposite occurred (a man won against a woman by a narrow margin). 19 In this setting,
the identification comes from the assumption that in close races random factors are crucial
17From a theoretical perspective, the median voter model would predict no differences in the decisions
that male and female politicians take. However, many other models may predict gender differences. For
example, theoretical models in which male and female politicians have different preferences (Alesina, 1988)
and are unable to commit to a specific policy during the electoral campaign would be consistent with gender
differences in policies.
18In our equations, t is year or term depending on the specification.
19See Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Rehavi (2007), Lee (2008), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), Pino (2011),
Brollo and Nannicini (2012), Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) and Vogl (2014) for other examples of RDD
in close elections.
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to decide elections. Therefore, the probability of winning is the same for both female and
male candidates.
The variable Fit defines the treatment status: Fit = 1 if the mayor is a woman, and Fit = 0
otherwise. The observed outcome is thus: τit = Fit · τit(1) + (1− Fit) · τit(0). The estimand
of interest is the ATE, E[τit(1)− τit(0)], defined over some sub-population of interest.
Specifically, we define the treatment group as the municipalities that have a mayor who
is a woman elected in a mixed-gender race. Assignment to treatment can be formalized as:
Femaleit = 1[MVit ≥ 0] (1)
where MVit is the female candidate margin of victory in municipality i during term t and 1[.]
the indicator function. MVit is specified as the vote share of the female candidate minus the
vote share of the male candidate. Therefore, it will take positive values if the mixed-gender
electoral race resulted in a female mayor, and negative if it resulted in a male mayor. At the
zero threshold, MVit = 0, the gender of the mayor Fit sharply changes from zero to one. MVit
can be seen as a random variable depending on observable and unobservable variables, as
well as on random events on election day. The standard RDD assumption is that potential
outcomes must be a continuous function of the running variable at the threshold (Hahn,
Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001). We indirectly test this assumption in section 4.4.20
The ATE in close elections is thus:
γ ≡ E[τit(1)− τit(0)|MVit = 0] = lim
MVit↓0
Yit − lim
MVit↑0
Yit (2)
γ is defined as a local effect, because it captures the impact of the gender of the mayor on
the outcome only for municipalities around the threshold MV = 0 (i.e. for the elections that
were decided for a margin that is small enough).
3.2 Estimation
We first analyze whether gender is correlated with our outcomes by estimating the following
OLS equations:
τit = ρ0 + ρ1Fit + µt + ηit (3)
20These assumptions refer to the potential outcomes. The actual outcome will be only one, and if gender
plays a role in affecting outcomes it will also be discontinuous at MV = 0.
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where τit is the outcome of interest in municipality i in time period t, Fit is a dummy that is
one when the mayor of the municipality is female, µt are year fixed effects and standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level because the same city may be observed in different
mayoral terms. We report the coefficient ρˆ1, which does not have a causal interpretation
because the gender of the politician might be correlated with the error term.21
We use two different methods to estimate the ATE expressed in equation (2). First, we
fit a p-order polynomial in MVit on either side of the threshold MVit = 0:
τit =
p∑
k=0
(ρkMV
k
it ) + Fit
p∑
k=0
(pikMV
k
it ) + µt + ηit, (4)
where MVit is the margin of victory in municipality i in time period t and standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level. The estimated coefficient pˆi0 identifies the ATE at the
threshold MVit = 0.
22
We then follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and use a local linear regression approach,
which restricts the sample to municipalities in the interval MVit ∈ [−h,+h] and estimates
the model:
τit = ρ0 + ρ1MVit + pi0Fit + pi1Fit ·MVit + µt + ηit (5)
where the optimal bandwith h is computed using the algorithm by Calonico, Cattaneo and
Titiunik (2014). Again, pˆi0 identifies the ATE at the threshold MVit = 0.
4 Results
4.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Brazil has 5,567 municipalities. For our analyses, we focus on those municipalities with mixed
gender mayoral races in the municipal elections held in 2000 and 2004. To implement our
identification strategy in the Brazilian multi-party system we further restrict our sample to
21This would happen, for instance, if municipalities that are more tolerant towards women are more likely
to elect female mayors, and these places also adopt different policies.
22This estimation strategy allows us to keep the whole sample, but results might be sensitive to outcome
values for observations far away from the threshold (see Imbens and Lemieux 2008). We follow the standard
procedure of fitting a third order polynomial. We also computed our estimations with lower or higher order
polynomials and found similar results.
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races with two candidates where one candidate is a woman and the other is a man.23 Races
with only two candidates amount to 51 percent of the total. If we further restrict the sample
to elections where we have two candidates of different gender, we end up with a sample of
723 races, representing 7 percent of all the races during our sample period.
Our outcomes are measured as the average across the years of each mayoral mandate and
each municipality. So our data are at the municipality-mandate level, and our specifications
always include mandate fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the municipality level.24
In Table 1 we summarize our variables according to the gender of the mayor. The first
panel of the table shows municipal characteristics, the second panel mayoral characteristics,
and the third and last panel our outcome variables. Our two candidates mixed gender
sample contains 723 races. However, due to data availability constraints, the number of
observations we have for the different dependent variables can be smaller. For instance,
we only have 161 observations for corruption in our sample, as we only observe corruption
for those municipalities that were randomly audited by the federal government. Data on
temporary employment in the public administration are available only for one of the mayoral
mandates (2005-2008), which reduces the number of observations for this variable to 381.
Finally, we only consider 254 observations for campaign contributions, as we observe this
variable only for those mayors that run for reelection.
Our estimation strategy controls for municipality-specific characteristics. Therefore we
should not expect any difference in municipal characteristics between treatment and control
groups around the cut-off MVit = 0. Our dataset allows us to test this for a vast array of
observable municipal characteristics, including geographic location, income and population.
These balance tests for municipal characteristics are reported in Table 2.25 We find that all
variables, including the gender wage gap at the municipality level, are balanced across the
23When including mixed gender races with more than two candidates we find evidence of non-random
sorting around the cutoff. Most of the candidates in mixed gender elections with more than two candidates
are male. This implies that any close election among more than two candidates is more likely to be won
by a male candidate rather than by a female candidate. For example, a close election between two male
candidates and one female candidate will result in a male mayor with probability= 23 and in a female mayor
with probability= 13 , if all candidates have the same probability of winning.
24We exclude an election-municipality observation if there are missing outcomes. For each outcome of
interest we have checked that missing values are balanced around the threshold.
25We perform these balance tests by applying a polynomial approximation. We also did the same check
by applying a local linear regression with optimal bandwidth and found similar results.
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cut-off MVit = 0.
26 Table 2 also reports the results of balance checks for several mayoral
characteristics (party affiliation, education, experience) showing that there is no discontinuity
around the cut-off. This is important as differences in mayoral characteristics could affect the
interpretation of the results. For example, if men are more likely to face a binding term limit
our estimates could potentially reflect the effect of this difference, and not gender differences
per-se.
The results of these balance checks are corroborated by visual inspection. Figures 1, 2, 3,
and 4 show scatterplots of the mean of municipal and mayoral characteristics. The variable
on the x-axis is the margin of victory, and the observations are averaged within bins of 2
percent of margin of victory. We plot the average of each of these variables for municipalities
in which women won (at the right of cut-off MVit = 0) and for municipalities where men
won (at the left of cut-off MVit = 0). We find no discontinuities around the threshold for all
variables.27
4.2 The Impact of Gender on Corruption, Campaign Contribu-
tions and Municipal Public Employment
Table 3 presents our main results. Panel A displays the results for corruption and campaign
contributions and Panel B presents the results for employment in the local administration.
For all of our outcomes, we report OLS results and two different specifications for the RDD
estimates.28
The results for corruption are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Panel A. As described
above, in these regressions we use as dependent variable a dummy variable that equals one
26This variable is computed using micro data from the 2000 Brazilian demographic census. We estimate,
for each Brazilian municipality, a regression of the log of the hourly wage on several observable characteristics
(age, residence region, education, occupation, and race) and a female dummy. The coefficient on this dummy
is our measure of the gender wage gap. Consistent with our findings, Eggers et al. (2013) analyze all mayoral
races in Brazil between 2000 and 2008 and find no evidence of sorting around the threshold.
27We find convergence in close elections also for the observables that do not seem to be balanced for
elections that are not close. For example, as can be seen in the graphs, female mayors are on average more
educated and younger than their male counterparts. However, in close elections even these variables are
similar and the jump is not statistically significant.
28We compute optimal bandwidth with the algorithm by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). In ad-
dition, to alleviate the concerns arising from the RD functional forms, we repeated the analysis implementing
a simple t-test of the means of all of our outcomes in closed intervals around the threshold MV = 0 (with
intervals getting smaller and smaller) and in most cases found statistically significant differences between
municipalities headed by women and men, as shown in the Appendix Table A7.
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if the mayor is found to be involved in at least one irregularity classified as corruption.
We can only estimate these regressions for those municipalities that were audited by the
anti-corruption program. The results show that women are less likely to be involved in
corruption episodes, on average. The size of the estimated coefficient is relatively similar
for the two RDD specifications and implies that the probability of observing a corruption
episode is around 29 to 35 percentage points lower in municipalities with female mayors
than in municipalities with male mayors. Despite the small sample size, it is reassuring that
corruption data are obtained from a random sampling procedure, given that the Brazilian
Anti-Corruption Program randomizes the auditing process. Because of the random nature
of the audits, we expect ex-ante that the probability of being audited does not depend on
the gender of the mayor. 29
We report the result for campaign contributions in columns 4, 5 and 6. We find that
female mayors attract about 30-55 percent less campaign contributions than male mayors
when running for reelection. This may be consistent with our corruption results, to the extent
that male mayors may be more likely to manipulate government procurement processes to
favor firms that donated to their campaigns. However, these results could also reflect that
male mayors might have a higher intrinsic ability to attract campaign contributions or gender
discrimination by donors.
We report the results for municipal public employment in columns 1 to 9 of Panel B. In
particular, columns 1 to 3 present results using as dependent variable the (log of) the number
of temporary employees in the municipal administration. Columns 4 to 6 show results for
the (log of) the number of permanent employees. We display in columns 7 to 9 the results
for the fraction of temporary public employees in the municipal administration. As described
above, our measure of temporary employment includes all non-permanent employees working
in the municipal administration, including commissioned positions (cargos comissionados),
which are positions directly appointed by the mayor without clear predefined criteria or
requirements. Permanent employees have to pass the civil service exams and have de jure
job stability, so we don’t expect this outcome variable to be sensitive to changes in the
political environment of the municipality. We find that female mayors hire only around 52
29In unreported tests, we verify that the gender of the mayor is not correlated with the probability that
a municipality is audited.
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percent as many temporary employees as men. This means that male mayors hire about 64
additional temporary public employees. We do not find a statistically significant difference
across gender for permanent public employees. Consistent with these results, we find that the
share of temporary employees in the municipal administration is about 9 percentage points
lower in municipalities with a female mayor.
If the differences between female and male mayors in terms of temporary employment
in the municipal administration documented in Table 3 reflect the fact that male mayors
increase temporary employment to improve their electoral chances, we wold expect to observe
these differences in the last year of the mandate and not necessarily before then. To analyze
this, Table 4 reports evidence about gender differences in the timing of temporary hires.
The dependent variable for the regressions reported in Columns 1 to 3 is the fraction of
temporary employees in the municipal administration during the first year of the mayoral
mandate. The dependent variable for regressions reported in Columns 4 to 6 is the fraction
of temporary employees in the municipal administration during the last year of the mayoral
mandate (when elections are held).30 We find that male mayors are more likely than women
to increase temporary hires during the last year of the term, while the difference across
genders is smaller and not statistically significant during the first year of the term. During
the last year, female mayors hire about 10-13 percentage points less temporary employees as
men. This means that male mayors hire about 80 additional temporary public employees in
the electoral year compared to women, which on average represents almost 1.5 percent of the
electorate (the average electorate size in our sample is around 6,000 voters). All in all, these
results suggest that the temporary hires may be related to patronage considerations.
Overall, our results suggest that women are less likely to be involved in corruption and
to engage in strategic behavior. This is broadly consistent with the experimental evidence,
which suggests that the choices women make once in power may be more socially oriented
than those of men.
Visual inspection of the outcomes in Figure 5 and 6 confirms the results described above,
as there are visible discontinuities around the cut-off, although the graphical estimates look
somewhat noisier than the statistical ones. However, it is re-assuring that a visible disconti-
30In unreported robustness tests, we don’t find evidence that mayors change the other policies we study
in the electoral year.
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nuity appears even for our corruption variable, for which statistical tests may have less power
because data are available only for a small subset of municipalities (those that were randomly
audited by the program). In all these figures, the outcomes are averaged into bins of inter-
vals of the margin of victory. Given that the density of the margin of victory is concentrated
around zero, points closer to zero (close races) are both more relevant for our strategy and
contain more information compared to those far from the zero margin of victory.31
4.3 The Impact of Gender on Reelection and Other Outcomes
Table 5 analyzes the effect of the gender of the mayor on the probability of reelection and on
the probability of re-running. We define both the probability of reelection and the probability
of re-running for all of the mayors that are not term limited. Therefore, the probability of
reelection is identified unconditionally of whether the mayor chooses to run for reelection.
According to the results reported columns 1 to 3, female mayors are around 20 percentage
points less likely to be reelected than male mayors, out of a baseline mean for male mayors
of 38 percent. The results reported in columns 4 to 6 show that the decision to run for
reelection is not affected by the gender of the mayor.32
Overall, we interpret our findings as showing that, despite being more corrupt, male
mayors are more likely to be reelected due to their involvement in patronage and their
ability to attract more campaign donations. However, there may be other explanations. For
instance, despite being more corrupt, male mayors may be doing better than female mayors
in some policies or may provide more public goods. Another potential explanation is that
female incumbents are perceived as having a different electoral strength than male mayors
when running for reelection and therefore attract more or better opponents, which reduces
their probability of reelection. The rest of the results in Tables 5 and those in Table 6 suggest
these alternative explanations are unlikely to account for our findings.
In Panels B, C and D of Table 5 we report results analysing gender differences in polices.
31See Appendix Figures A1 and A2.
32Even if female mayors after a mixed gender close election are less likely to be reelected, this does not
imply that female mayors that were elected during a close election are less likely to be in a second term.
Our outcome “Probability of reelection” refers to the election subsequent to the mixed gender close election.
This means that the margin of victory of the incumbent mayor in the subsequent elections or the gender of
the opponent are most likely different. On the other hand, the variable on which we implement the balance
checks refers to a second term during the current election.
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Following Table 3, we report the OLS estimates and two different specifications for the RDD
estimates. Panel B reports results for different measures of transfers for capital investment:
(log of per-capita) total transfers for capital investment (columns 1 to 3), (log of per-capita)
discretionary transfers for capital investment (columns 4 to 6) and (log of per-capita) non-
discretionary transfers for capital investment (columns 7 to 9). Our RDD estimates show
that women attract significantly more transfers for capital investment for their municipalities.
These results are driven by discretionary transfers, as we find no significant differences for
non-discretionary transfers. This result is reassuring, as non-discretionary transfers for capi-
tal investment are rule-based and thus should not be affected by the gender of the mayor. In
terms of economic magnitude, our results show that female mayors attract about 60 percent
more transfers for capital investment than their male counterparts. These results are con-
firmed by visual inspection of Figure 7. In Brazil, the effort of the mayor in attracting these
transfers is not the only determinant of the amount of transfers these municipalities receive.
The interest of the (state or federal) legislature and executive power in providing resources
to municipalities is another important determinant. It is therefore particularly reassuring
that among our balance tests we include whether the mayor is aligned with the parties in
the coalition of the federal president, with the party of the elected state and federal deputy
elected that were most voted in the municipality, and with the party of the state governor.
For these balance checks we find that male and female mayors elected in close elections have
an equal probability of being aligned with higher order officials. So the differences be find
between male and female mayors in terms of discretionary transfers are unlikely to be driven
by party alignment.33
Panel C of Table 5 reports the results for our health care outcomes: percentage of women
who received at least one prenatal visit (columns 1 to 3) and percentage of births in which
the baby was not premature (columns 4 to 6). According to our RDD estimates in columns
2 and 3, the percentage of women with at least one prenatal visit is higher in municipalities
headed by female mayors. We find that the share of pregnant women that receive at least one
prenatal visit increases by about 1.6 percentage points (an increase of about 1.25 percent).
Moreover, in these municipalities, the probability of a regular birth (e.g., non-premature)
33As a falsification test, we also performed RDD estimations on automatic constitutional transfers from
the federal government (FPM), which in principle cannot be affected neither by the federal nor the local
government, and found no effect of gender on their allocation.
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is relatively higher. According to our RDD estimates in column 5 and 6, the fraction of
regular births (i.e. non-premature ones) increases by 1 percentage points (an increase of
1.05 percent) in municipalities headed by female mayors.34 The relatively small magnitude
of these effects reflects the fact that in most municipalities most women receive at least one
prenatal medical visit (the mean of this variable for our sample of mixed gender races is 97.4
percent) and that most of the births are non-premature (sample mean of 94.6 percent).
Panel D of Table 5 reports the results for our education outcomes related to the physical
infrastructure used for education. Columns 1 to 3 report the results for the share of municipal
public schools with a library. Columns 4 to 6 report the results for the share of municipal
public schools with a science lab. Columns 7 to 9 report the results for the share of municipal
public schools with internet. We don’t find any evidence that male mayors do a better job
in providing educational public goods. These results are confirmed by visual inspection of
Figure 8.
In Table 6 we analyze the hypothesis that female mayors face a different competition
than men when running for reelection. If women faced a stronger competition this could
potentially explain why female mayors are less likely to be reelected. We consider both the
quantity (number) and the quality of candidates challenging the incumbent for reelection.
Following Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011) we measure quality using the education
of the political candidates. Columns 1 to 3 report results analyzing the (log of) number of
candidates. Columns 4 to 6 report results for the (log of) number of candidates with at least
college degree. Columns 7 to 9 report results for the (log of) number of candidates with at
least high school degree. We do not find any evidence that female mayors are more likely to
face tougher competition compared to their male counterparts. These results are confirmed
by visual inspection of Figure 8.
4.4 Validity Tests and External Validity
RDD estimates in close races rely on the assumption that political candidates cannot manip-
ulate the electoral outcomes. To test this assumption, we conduct several robustness checks.
First, we check for nonrandom sorting by visually inspecting the histogram of the margin of
34To the best of our knowledge, the only other health outcome that is readily available at the municipal
level from Brazilian data is birth weight. We found no evidence that this is affected by the gender of the
mayor.
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victory and verify that there are no spikes at the right or the left-hand side of the discon-
tinuity (see Appendix Figure A1). Second, we address the concern of non-random sorting
by formally testing the continuity of the density of the margin of victory, following McCrary
(2008), in Appendix Figure A2. This procedure tests the null hypothesis of continuity of
the density of the margin of victory at the zero threshold, and it is implemented by running
kernel local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of zero. We
find no evidence of discontinuities in the margin of victory of the female candidate.
Throughout the paper, we have provided evidence that supports the view that gender
differences in patronage and campaign contributions could explain why male mayors have
a higher reelection probability, despite being more likely to engage in corruption. If this is
the case, then we should see that our results hold for the subsample of municipalities where
the mayor is eligible to run for reelection, e.g. the same sample we use for our reelection
outcomes. We re-estimate our results, restricting our sample to municipalities where mayors
are eligible to run for reelection. Appendix Tables A1 to A5 report the results. Our main
results are virtually unchanged in this sample, with the exception of corruption. For this
outcome, we find similar point estimates as for the whole sample but we lose statistical
significance because of the smaller sample size.
Our empirical strategy is valid for municipalities with a close mixed gender election.
However, it is possible that our results do not generalize to the rest of Brazilian municipalities.
In Appendix Table A6 we compare the municipality and mayoral characteristics in our sample
to the rest of Brazilian municipalities and mayors. Municipalities in our sample are smaller
and poorer than the rest of Brazilian municipalities. They are also more likely to be have a
higher gender wage gap in the labor market.
A possible concern when performing a regression discontinuity design is that results might
be driven by the specific functional forms considered. Our baseline results are obtained using
a third order polynomial. In unreported robustness tests, we also find similar results using a
second- or fourth-order polynomials and local linear specification using optimal bandwidths
with different methodologies. To further alleviate concerns arising from the specific RDD
functional forms considered, we repeated the analysis implementing a simple t-test of the
means of all of our outcomes in closed intervals around the threshold MV = 0 (with inter-
vals getting smaller and smaller) and in most cases found statistically significant differences
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between municipalities headed by women and men. We report these results in Table A7 in
the Appendix.
Finally, we performed a set of placebo tests to rule out the possibility that our results
arise from random chance rather than a true underlining causal relationship. To do this, in
the spirit of DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2012), for all our outcome variables we conduct a
set of RDD estimations at false thresholds of the margin of victory. In particular, for each
outcome we estimated 580 RDD regressions considering fake margins of victory between 30
percent and 1 percent below and above the threshold (using increments of 0.1 percent). In
Appendix Figures A3 to A6 we plot the cumulative density function of the t-statistics of the
fake treatment effects from these regressions. At these false thresholds, we expect to find no
systematic evidence of treatment effects.35 The figures show that most of the coefficients from
these placebo tests are not statistically significant, providing strong support to the robustness
of our main results. Finally, as a falsification test, we also performed RDD estimations on
automatic constitutional transfers from the federal government (FPM), which in principle
cannot be affected neither by the federal nor the local government, and found no effect of
gender on their allocation (results are available upon request).
For most of our empirical results, the size of the effect of gender in the RDD estimates
is larger, and more likely to be statistically different from zero, than the effect estimated
by the OLS specifications. This could be explained by at least two reasons. First, the RD
design controls for municipality-specific confounding factors, which might attenuate the effect
estimated using OLS.36 Second, the RD coefficient is identified by close elections, whereas the
OLS coefficient averages over all races (competitive and non-competitive races). If politicians
of different genders behave differently in competitive and non-competitive races, this could
explain the differences between OLS and RDD coefficients.
35The figure reports the t-test from a specification with 3rd-order polynomial; results are virtually un-
changed with a local linear specification in an optimal bandwidth.
36Our empirical strategy controls for unobservable municipality-specific confounding factors, but it is still
possible that some individual level characteristics are correlated with the gender of the mayor. While we
acknowledge this limitation, which is probably the main empirical challenge for this literature, we believe that
it is reassuring that all of our individual level observable variables converge in close elections, as confirmed
by visual inspection of Figures 3, and 4.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the effect of the gender of the policymaker on possible
different dimensions of corruption in the municipal administration. By using an adminis-
trative measure of corruption based on random government audits and using a Regression
Discontinuity (RD) design in close electoral races, we show that female mayors are less likely
to be involved in corruption. We also find that male mayors are more likely to increase tem-
porary public employment, especially during the electoral year, a sign of electoral patronage.
In addition, male mayors attract more campaign contributions when they run for re-election.
We then look at the reelection outcomes of these mayors. We find that female mayors are
less likely to be reelected to office compared to their male counterparts. Our results suggest
that, despite being more corrupt, male mayors are more likely to be reelected due to their
involvement in strategic activities to gain re-election. We discuss other interpretations that
receive less support in the data.
Our results raise a number of additional questions for future research. First, we are able
to identify our effects in close elections, characterized by a high degree of competition. Our
identification strategy does not allow us to identify the link between gender and policies
in situations characterized by absence of electoral competition. Competition might per se
enhance gender differences. A rapidly growing literature is making political competition an
endogenous variable that can be chosen to maximize voters’ welfare (Caselli et al., 2012). It
is an exciting direction for future research to examine how a change in the degree of electoral
competition may affect differentially the gender differences that we find.
Second, and related to the previous point, our results are obtained in a setting where fe-
male politicians can face competition from male politicians. It is thus not clear whether these
findings would also apply to a setting with quotas reserved for female politicians.37 In fact,
an interesting direction for future research would be to understand whether policies aimed
at increasing female participation in politics through quotas that restrict cross-gender com-
petition have different implications than policies aimed at increasing the number of women
competing in open elections.
Finally, it is unclear whether our results would persist in countries with different attitudes
37See Fre´chette, Maniquet and Morelli (2008), De Paola, Scoppa and Lombardo (2010), Pande and Ford
(2011) and Besley et al. (2012) for analyses of the effects of introducing gender quotas in different settings.
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toward women compared to Brazil. Recent research suggests different channels through which
attitudes toward women may affect policies and outcomes (Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Beaman
et al., 2009; Pino, 2011; Givati and Troiano, 2012). Policymakers may benefit from explicitly
accounting for those slow-moving constraints when designing policies aimed at increasing the
participation of women in politics.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics – Municipalities with a Female Mayors
vs Municipalities with a Male Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female obs Male obs p-value
Mayor Mayor
Municipal characteristics
Population 12,492 316 12,220 407 0.846
Income per-capita (R$) 131 316 131 407 0.977
Literacy rate 0.500 316 0.504 407 0.649
Urban 0.556 316 0.553 407 0.847
Water supply 0.549 316 0.549 407 0.968
Electricity 0.839 316 0.839 407 0.990
Sewerage supply 0.170 316 0.170 407 0.994
Radio 0.118 316 0.103 407 0.541
Wage gap 0.097 316 0.104 407 0.460
Absenteeism 0.179 316 0.174 407 0.438
North 0.089 316 0.081 407 0.718
Northeast 0.494 316 0.482 407 0.747
Center 0.092 316 0.096 407 0.853
South 0.130 316 0.128 407 0.937
Southeast 0.196 316 0.214 407 0.563
Mayoral characteristics
Term limit 0.259 316 0.364 407 0.003
Politician 0.121 316 0.106 407 0.487
Age 52 316 54 407 0.117
College 0.485 316 0.332 407 0.000
High school 0.920 316 0.779 407 0.000
Primary school 0.080 316 0.221 407 0.000
Married 0.744 316 0.804 407 0.047
President coalition 0.228 316 0.263 407 0.282
State governor party 0.203 316 0.201 407 0.972
Federal deputy party 0.335 316 0.346 407 0.758
State deputy party 0.291 316 0.305 407 0.707
PSDB 0.156 316 0.165 407 0.789
DEM 0.216 316 0.209 407 0.828
PMDB 0.244 316 0.209 407 0.262
PT 0.019 316 0.039 407 0.116
Outcomes
Charges of corruption 0.780 59 0.853 102 0.240
Temporary public employees 120 166 135 215 0.468
Permanent public employees 344 166 336 215 0.830
Fraction of temporary public employees 0.243 166 0.263 215 0.207
Fraction of temporary public employees first year 0.247 166 0.258 215 0.526
Fraction of temporary public employees last year 0.234 166 0.260 215 0.146
Campaign Contributions 39,548 114 74,834 140 0.043
Re-run 0.530 234 0.564 259 0.453
reelection 0.299 234 0.390 259 0.034
Non-discretionary transfers 12 316 14 407 0.483
Discretionary transfers 37 316 34 407 0.486
Total transfers 49 316 48 407 0.805
Non premature births 0.950 316 0.950 407 0.978
Any prenatal visits 0.974 316 0.974 407 0.933
% of schools with internet 0.239 316 0.238 407 0.953
% of schools with science lab 0.113 316 0.109 407 0.833
% of schools with library 0.373 316 0.383 407 0.705
N. of candidates 2.519 316 2.587 407 0.290
N. of candidates with at least higher education 1.225 316 1.269 407 0.543
N. of candidates with at least college 1.073 316 1.087 407 0.845
Notes. Female considers the two-candidates mixed races sample where the winner candidate
is woman and the loser candidate is a man. Male considers the two-candidates mixed races
sample where the winner candidate is a man and the loser candidate is a woman. Columns (1)
and (3) report the average values in the respective samples; obs is the number of observations;
p-value refers to the statistical significance of the difference between means. See Table 7 for
the definition of the variables.
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Table 4: The Impact of Gender on Municipal Public Employment
First and Last Year of Mayoral Mandate, RDD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable
Fraction of temporary Fraction of temporary
public employees - public employees -
first year of last year of
mayoral mandate mayoral mandate
Specification
OLS Spline LLR OLS Spline LLR
polynomial polynomial
Female -0.010 -0.036 -0.017 -0.026 -0.136*** -0.112***
(0.016) (0.044) (0.045) (0.018) (0.043) (0.040)
Observations 381 381 193 381 381 252
Optimal h 12 17
Notes. This table shows results for OLS, RDD 3rd order spline polynomial and local linear regressions
with optimal bandwidth calculated as in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). RDD specifications
with split polynomial and local linear regression following equations (4) and (5), respectively. h denotes
the interval of our running variable. For instance h=10 represents mixed gender races where margin
of victory is between -10% and 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***. See Table 7 for the definition of the variables.
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Table 7: The Definition of the Variables
Panel A: Municipal Characteristics
Income per-capita income in 2000 in Brazilian reais .
Population number of inhabitants.
Literacy rate fraction of people above age 20 who are literate.
Urbanization fraction of people living in urban areas.
Electricity fraction of houses with access to electricity.
Water fraction of houses linked to the water system.
Sewer fraction of houses linked to the sewerage system.
Radio equals one if there is at least one local radio station in the municipality.
Absenteeism fraction of voters that did not vote.
Gender wage gap estimated gender salary gap.
North Brazilian North-region
Northeast Brazilian Northeast-region
Center Brazilian Center-region
South Brazilian South-region
Southeast Brazilian Southeast-region
Area area size of the municipality.
Panel B: Politician Characteristics
Primary school equal to one if the mayor has at most an elementary school degree.
High school equal to one if the mayor has at least high school degree.
College equal to one if the mayor has at least college degree.
Married equal to one if the mayor is married.
Politician equal to one if the mayor has previous experience in politics.
Term limit equal to one if the mayor is not eligible to run for reelection.
Age age of the candidate at the time of the elections.
PSDB equal to one if the mayor belongs to the PSDB political party.
DEM equal to one if the mayor belongs to the DEM political party.
PMDB equal to one if the mayor belongs to the PMDB political party.
PT equal to one if the mayor belongs to the PT political party.
President coalition equal to one if the mayor is affiliated with a party
belonging to the president’s coalition.
State governor party equal to one if the mayor is affiliated with the state governor’s party
Federal deputy party equal to one if the mayor is affiliated with the party of the most voted elected
federal deputy in the municipality
State deputy party equal to one if the mayor is affiliated with the party of the most voted elected
state deputy in the municipality
Panel C: Outcome Variables
Charges of corruption equal to one if at least one episode of corruption is reported.
Temporary public employees number of temporary public employees in the municipal administration.
Permanent public employees number of permanent public employees in the municipal administration.
Fraction of temporary public employees number of temporary public employees divided by total number public employees
that work directly in the municipal administration.
Fraction of temporary public employees first year number of temporary public employees divided by total number public employees
during the first year of the mandate.
Fraction of temporary public employees last year number of temporary public employees divided by total number public employees
during the last year of the mandate.
Campaign contributions total amount of campaign contributions (in Reais R$) to a specific candidate.
Re-election equal to one if the incumbent mayor is reelected.
Re-run equal to one if the incumbent mayor runs in the subsequent election.
Discretionary transfers yearly federal and state discretionary transfers to municipalities earmarked
for capital investment in all sectors (per-capita values in 2000 Brazilian reais).
Non-discretionary transfers yearly federal and state non-discretionary transfers to municipalities earmarked
for capital investment in all sectors (log of per-capita values in 2000 Brazilian reais).
Total transfers total yearly federal and state transfers to municipalities earmarked
for capital investment in all sectors (log of per-capita values in 2000 Brazilian reais).
Any prenatal visits fraction of pregnant women with at least one prenatal visit before delivery.
Non premature births fraction of births that are not premature.
% of schools with library share of schools with library
% of schools with science lab share of schools with science lab
% of schools with internet share of schools with access to internet
Number of candidates number of candidates for mayor in the subsequent future race
Number of candidates with college number of candidates for mayor in the subsequent future race
with at least college degree
Number of candidates with high education number of candidates for mayor in the subsequent future race
with at least high school degree
Notes. This table shows the definition of the variables used in our analyses.
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Figure 1: Balance Tests – Pre-Treatment Municipal Characteristics
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. This sample
considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. Gender wage gap is the estimated gender salary gap,
see paper for details about the estimation of this variable. See Table 7 for the definition of the variables.
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Figure 2: Balance Tests – Invariant Municipal Characteristics
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green lines
are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals.
This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. North, Northeast, Center, South, and
Southeast are the Brazilian macro-regions. Area refers to the area size of the municipality.
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Figure 3: Balance Checks– Mayoral Education and Political Experience
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green
lines are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent
intervals. This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. See Table 7 for the definition
of the variables.
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Figure 4: Balance Checks – Mayoral Political Party Affiliation
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green
lines are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent
intervals. This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. See Table 7 for the definition
of the variables.
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Figure 5: The Effects of Gender on Corruption, Electoral Outcomes and Campaign Contri-
butions
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. This sample
considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. See Table 7 for the definition of the variables.
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Figure 6: The Effects of Gender on Municipal Public Employment
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The sample
for reelections probabilities considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. The sample for public
employment considers races in 2004 municipal elections. See Table 7 for the definition of the variables.
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Figure 7: The Effects of Gender on Transfers for Capital Investment and Health
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The sample
for reelections probabilities considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. The sample for public
employment considers races in 2004 municipal elections. See Table 7 for the definition of the variables.
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Figure 8: The Effects of Gender on Future Races and Education
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The sample
for reelections probabilities considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. The sample for public
employment considers races in 2004 municipal elections. See Table 7 for the definition of the variables.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
This Appendix provides additional summary statistics, results and robustness checks, which
are also discussed in the paper. In particular, we present the following:
• Summary statistics for our mixed gender races sample in municipalities where the mayor
is eligible to run for reelection (Table A1);
• Discontinuities of town and mayoral characteristics in mixed close races in municipali-
ties where the mayor is eligible to run for reelection (Table A2);
• Results for the impact of gender on corruption and municipal public employment, in
municipalities where the mayor is eligible to run for reelection (Table A3);
• Results for the impact of gender on municipal public employment, by first and last
year of the electoral mandate, in municipalities where the mayor is eligible to run for
reelection (Table A4);
• Results for the impact of gender on other outcomes, in municipalities where the mayor
is eligible to run for reelection (Table A5);
• Summary statistics for the two-candidates mixed gender races sample versus other races
(Table A6);
• T-test of the outcomes in close elections with different intervals of margin of victory of
the female candidate (Table A7);
• Frequency of margin of victory for the two-candidates mixed-gender races (Figure A1);
• McCrary Test, Two Candidates Mixed-Gender Races (Figure A2);
• Placebo tests based on permutation methods for all our outcomes (Figure A3, A4, A5,
and A6).
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Table A1: Summary Statistics – Municipalities with a Female Mayors
vs Municipalities with a Male Mayor –
When the Mayor is Eligible to Run for Reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female obs Male obs p-value
Mayor Mayor
Municipal characteristics
Population 11,701 234 13,344 259 0.347
Income per-capita (R$) 131 234 131 259 0.980
Literacy rate 0.509 234 0.503 259 0.625
Urban 0.565 234 0.554 259 0.546
Water supply 0.561 234 0.540 259 0.324
Electricity 0.842 234 0.836 259 0.715
Sewerage supply 0.175 234 0.183 259 0.730
Radio 0.125 234 0.112 259 0.667
Wage gap 0.106 234 0.105 259 0.943
Absenteeism 0.181 234 0.176 259 0.623
North 0.090 234 0.085 259 0.851
Northeast 0.457 234 0.471 259 0.760
Center 0.107 234 0.093 259 0.600
South 0.141 234 0.116 259 0.404
Southeast 0.205 234 0.236 259 0.418
Mayoral characteristics
Politician 0.075 234 0.057 259 0.441
Age 51 234 53 259 0.125
College 0.510 234 0.375 259 0.002
Higer education 0.944 234 0.819 259 0.000
Primary education 0.056 234 0.181 259 0.000
President coalition 0.270 234 0.293 259 0.559
State governor party 0.192 234 0.170 259 0.519
Federal deputy party 0.303 234 0.301 259 0.957
State deputy party 0.265 234 0.247 259 0.651
PSDB 0.131 234 0.147 259 0.618
DEM 0.197 234 0.197 259 0.998
PMDB 0.223 234 0.205 259 0.628
PT 0.026 234 0.050 259 0.159
Outcomes
Charges of corruption 0.775 40 0.863 66 0.243
Temporary public employees 106 132 150 150 0.071
Permanent public employees 334 132 335 150 0.974
Fraction of temporary public employees 0.243 132 0.276 150 0.088
Fraction of temporary public employees first year 0.246 132 0.266 150 0.285
Fraction of temporary public employees last year 0.235 132 0.275 150 0.066
Re-run 0.530 234 0.564 259 0.453
reelection 0.299 234 0.390 259 0.034
Non-discretionary transfers 12 234 12 259 0.814
Discretionary transfers 33 234 36 259 0.577
Total transfers 45 234 48 259 0.543
Non premature births 0.948 234 0.950 259 0.691
Any prenatal visits 0.975 234 0.975 259 0.846
% of schools with internet 0.261 234 0.249 259 0.679
% of schools with science lab 0.122 234 0.117 259 0.785
% of schools with library 0.396 234 0.385 259 0.719
N. of candidates 2.521 234 2.575 259 0.491
N. of candidates with at least high school 1.299 234 1.290 259 0.912
N. of candidates with at least college 1.150 234 1.112 259 0.652
Notes. Female mayor considers the two-candidates mixed races sample where the win-
ner candidate is woman and the loser candidate is a man. Male mayor considers the
two-candidates mixed races sample where the winner candidate is a man and the loser
candidate is a woman. Columns (1) and (3) report the average values in the respective
samples; obs is the number of observations; p-value refers to the statistical significance of
the difference between means. See Table 7 in the paper for the definition of the variables.
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Table A4: Impact of Gender on Municipal Public Employment
by First and Last Year of Mayoral Mandate –
When the Mayor is Eligible to Run for Reelection, RDD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable
Fraction of temporary Fraction of temporary
public employees - public employees -
first year of last year of
mayoral mandate mayoral mandate
Specification
OLS Spline LLR OLS Spline LLR
polynomial polynomial
Female -0.020 -0.083* -0.071 -0.039* -0.172*** -0.139***
(0.018) (0.049) (0.048) (0.021) (0.050) (0.048)
Observations 282 282 168 282 282 185
Optimal h 14 16
Notes. This table shows results for OLS, RDD 3rd order spline polynomial and local linear regressions
with optimal bandwidth calculated as in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). RDD specifications
with split polynomial and local linear regression following equations equations 4 and 5 in the paper,
respectively. h denotes the interval of our running variable. For instance h=10 represents mixed
gender races where margin of victory is between -10% and 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***. See Table 7 in the paper for the definition of the variables.
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Table A6: Summary Statistics – Mixed Races vs Other Races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Other obs Mixed obs p-value
races races
Municipal characteristics
Population 24,733 10,068 12,339 723 0.000
Income per-capita (R$) 163 10,068 131 723 0.000
Literacy rate 0.558 10,068 0.502 723 0.000
Urban 0.589 10,068 0.554 723 0.000
Water supply 0.581 10,068 0.549 723 0.000
Electricity 0.870 10,068 0.839 723 0.000
Sewerage supply 0.229 10,068 0.170 723 0.000
Radio 0.211 10,068 0.109 723 0.000
Wage gap 0.134 10,068 0.101 723 0.000
Absenteeism 0.184 10,068 0.176 723 0.019
North 0.082 10,068 0.084 723 0.826
Northeast 0.314 10,068 0.487 723 0.000
Center 0.082 10,068 0.094 723 0.275
South 0.216 10,068 0.129 723 0.000
Southeast 0.306 10,068 0.206 723 0.000
Mayoral characteristics
Term limit 0.288 10,068 0.318 723 0.082
Politician 0.098 10,068 0.113 723 0.209
Age 54 10,068 53 723 0.664
College 0.402 10,068 0.399 723 0.854
Higer education 0.847 10,068 0.840 723 0.609
Primary education 0.153 10,068 0.160 723 0.609
President coalition 0.271 10,068 0.248 723 0.174
Governor’s coalition 0.199 10,068 0.202 723 0.856
Federal deputy’s coalition 0.311 10,068 0.342 723 0.088
Estate deputy’s coalition 0.280 10,068 0.298 723 0.293
PSDB 0.169 10,068 0.161 723 0.616
DEM 0.161 10,068 0.212 723 0.000
PMDB 0.208 10,068 0.224 723 0.295
PT 0.054 10,068 0.030 723 0.006
Outcomes
Charges of corruption 0.757 2,053 0.820 161 0.071
Temporary public employees 194 5,027 128 381 0.000
Permanent public employees 552 5,027 340 381 0.000
Fraction of temporary public employees 0.250 5,027 0.254 381 0.556
Fraction of temporary public employees first year 0.255 5,012 0.253 381 0.881
Fraction of temporary public employees last year 0.245 5,017 0.250 381 0.665
Re-run 0.353 7,168 0.347 493 0.789
reelection 0.573 7,168 0.548 493 0.278
Non-discretionary transfers 11 10,068 13 723 0.042
Discretionary transfers 30 10,068 36 723 0.000
Total transfers 41 10,068 49 723 0.000
Non premature births 0.946 10,068 0.950 723 0.005
Any prenatal visits 0.975 10,068 0.974 723 0.553
% of schools with internet 0.284 10,068 0.238 723 0.000
% of schools with science lab 0.113 10,068 0.111 723 0.758
% of schools with library 0.437 10,068 0.378 723 0.000
N. of candidates 2.776 10,068 2.557 723 0.000
N. of candidates with at least higher education 1.406 10,068 1.250 723 0.000
N. of candidates with at least college 1.195 10,068 1.081 723 0.005
Notes. Female mayor considers the two-candidates mixed races sample where the winner can-
didate is woman and the loser candidate is a man. Male mayor considers the two-candidates
mixed races sample where the winner candidate is a man and the loser candidate is a woman.
Columns (1) and (3) report the average values in the respective samples; obs is the number of
observations; p-value refers to the statistical significance of the difference between means. See
Table 7 in the paper for the definition of the variables.
51
T
ab
le
A
7:
T
-t
es
t
of
th
e
O
u
tc
om
es
in
C
lo
se
E
le
ct
io
n
s
w
it
h
D
iff
er
en
t
In
te
rv
al
s
of
th
e
M
ar
gi
n
of
V
ic
to
ry
of
th
e
F
em
al
e
C
an
d
id
at
e:
F
em
al
e
v
s
M
al
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
(1
5
)
O
u
tc
o
m
es
M
V
In
te
rv
a
l
[−
5
;+
5
]
M
V
In
te
rv
a
l
[−
7
.5
;+
7
.5
]
M
V
In
te
rv
a
l
[−
1
0
;+
1
0
]
F
em
a
le
o
b
s
M
a
le
o
b
s
p
-v
a
lu
e
F
em
a
le
o
b
s
M
a
le
o
b
s
p
-v
a
lu
e
F
em
a
le
o
b
s
M
a
le
o
b
s
p
-v
a
lu
e
C
h
a
rg
es
o
f
co
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
0
.6
8
7
1
7
0
.9
0
9
2
2
0
.0
8
6
0
.6
4
2
2
8
0
.9
0
0
3
0
0
.0
1
9
0
.6
7
6
3
5
0
.8
7
5
4
0
0
.0
3
9
T
em
p
o
ra
ry
p
u
b
li
c
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
(l
o
g
)
4
.2
0
2
4
2
4
.5
8
6
4
7
0
.0
9
6
4
.1
8
6
5
7
4
.5
8
6
6
4
0
.0
3
8
4
.2
2
6
7
8
4
.5
3
3
8
4
0
.0
7
4
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
p
u
b
li
c
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
(l
o
g
)
5
.5
8
9
4
2
5
.4
8
5
4
7
0
.4
8
0
5
.5
7
3
5
7
5
.5
1
0
6
4
0
.6
0
3
5
.6
0
3
7
8
5
.5
3
5
8
4
0
.5
2
0
F
ra
ct
io
n
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
p
u
b
li
c
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
0
.2
3
8
4
2
0
.3
0
2
4
7
0
.0
5
5
0
.2
3
4
5
7
0
.2
9
8
6
4
0
.0
2
1
0
.2
3
5
7
8
0
.2
9
2
8
4
0
.0
2
0
F
ra
ct
io
n
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
p
u
b
.
em
p
l.
fi
rs
t
y
ea
r
0
.2
5
6
4
2
0
.2
8
7
4
7
0
.3
8
6
0
.2
5
1
5
7
0
.2
8
2
6
4
0
.2
9
4
0
.2
4
5
7
8
0
.2
7
5
8
4
0
.2
5
1
F
ra
ct
io
n
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
p
u
b
.
em
p
l.
la
st
y
ea
r
0
.2
1
7
4
2
0
.2
9
8
4
7
0
.0
2
7
0
.2
1
7
5
7
0
.2
9
9
6
4
0
.0
0
8
0
.2
2
5
7
8
0
.2
9
2
8
4
0
.0
1
5
C
a
m
p
a
ig
n
co
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s
(l
o
g
)
9
.7
3
9
3
0
1
0
.3
7
8
3
2
0
.0
9
4
9
.9
5
7
4
4
1
0
.3
9
9
4
7
0
.1
2
8
9
.9
9
1
5
6
1
0
.3
6
1
6
5
0
.1
3
7
R
e-
ru
n
0
.5
6
7
6
0
0
.5
0
0
6
6
0
.4
5
8
0
.5
7
6
8
5
0
.5
4
9
9
1
0
.7
2
0
0
.5
4
4
1
1
4
0
.5
7
5
1
2
0
0
.6
3
3
re
el
ec
ti
o
n
0
.2
0
0
6
0
0
.3
4
8
6
6
0
.0
6
4
0
.2
2
4
8
5
0
.3
5
2
9
1
0
.0
6
2
0
.2
5
4
1
1
4
0
.3
6
7
1
2
0
0
.0
6
4
N
o
n
-d
is
cr
et
io
n
a
ry
tr
a
n
sf
er
s
(l
o
g
)
1
.4
6
0
8
1
1
.4
5
0
8
5
0
.9
5
3
1
.5
8
7
1
1
2
1
.5
2
5
1
2
3
0
.6
8
9
1
.5
4
8
1
5
1
1
.5
5
9
1
6
1
0
.9
3
9
D
is
cr
et
io
n
a
ry
tr
a
n
sf
er
s
(l
o
g
)
1
1
.3
7
7
8
1
9
.4
9
8
8
5
0
.0
0
5
1
1
.2
4
5
1
1
2
9
.4
4
2
1
2
3
0
.0
0
2
1
1
.2
6
0
1
5
1
9
.5
4
2
1
6
0
0
.0
0
1
T
o
ta
l
tr
a
n
sf
er
s
(l
o
g
)
1
1
.8
8
6
8
1
1
1
.1
6
7
8
5
0
.1
4
9
1
1
.9
3
8
1
1
2
1
1
.2
0
6
1
2
3
0
.0
7
6
1
2
.0
3
2
1
5
1
1
1
.2
4
0
1
6
0
0
.0
3
0
N
o
n
p
re
m
a
tu
re
b
ir
th
s
0
.9
5
4
8
1
0
.9
4
7
8
5
0
.2
7
9
0
.9
5
5
1
1
2
0
.9
4
9
1
2
3
0
.2
2
2
0
.9
5
5
1
5
1
0
.9
4
9
1
6
1
0
.1
7
3
A
n
y
p
re
n
a
ta
l
v
is
it
s
0
.9
7
7
8
1
0
.9
6
9
8
5
0
.2
2
8
0
.9
7
9
1
1
2
0
.9
6
9
1
2
3
0
.0
3
2
0
.9
7
9
1
5
1
0
.9
7
1
1
6
1
0
.0
2
2
%
o
f
sc
h
o
o
ls
w
it
h
in
te
rn
et
0
.1
9
0
8
1
0
.1
9
0
8
5
0
.9
9
6
0
.2
0
9
1
1
2
0
.1
8
6
1
2
3
0
.5
6
3
0
.2
1
6
1
5
1
0
.2
0
2
1
6
1
0
.6
8
9
%
o
f
sc
h
o
o
ls
w
it
h
sc
ie
n
ce
la
b
0
.0
9
7
8
1
0
.0
8
3
8
5
0
.6
1
9
0
.0
9
3
1
1
2
0
.0
7
4
1
2
3
0
.3
7
4
0
.1
0
1
1
5
1
0
.0
9
2
1
6
1
0
.7
0
5
%
o
f
sc
h
o
o
ls
w
it
h
li
b
ra
ry
0
.3
4
5
8
1
0
.3
6
7
8
5
0
.6
8
2
0
.3
5
4
1
1
2
0
.3
4
0
1
2
3
0
.7
5
6
0
.3
5
9
1
5
1
0
.3
3
7
1
6
1
0
.5
6
1
N
.
o
f
ca
n
d
id
a
te
s
(l
o
g
)
1
.2
2
9
8
1
1
.2
3
4
8
5
0
.8
7
1
1
.2
3
8
1
1
2
1
.2
3
8
1
2
3
0
.9
9
3
1
.2
3
4
1
5
1
1
.2
5
0
1
6
1
0
.5
0
4
N
.
o
f
ca
n
d
id
a
te
s
w
it
h
h
ig
h
er
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(l
o
g
)
0
.7
2
9
8
1
0
.6
8
0
8
5
0
.4
9
4
0
.7
6
4
1
1
2
0
.6
9
1
1
2
3
0
.2
2
0
0
.7
3
6
1
5
1
0
.6
9
1
1
6
1
0
.3
8
9
N
.
o
f
ca
n
d
id
a
te
s
w
it
h
co
ll
eg
e
(l
o
g
)
0
.6
3
0
8
1
0
.6
3
1
8
5
0
.9
8
4
0
.6
7
5
1
1
2
0
.6
4
0
1
2
3
0
.5
6
6
0
.6
5
6
1
5
1
0
.6
1
8
1
6
1
0
.4
7
1
N
o
te
s.
M
ea
n
-c
o
m
p
a
ri
so
n
te
st
s
fo
r
sa
m
p
le
s
o
f
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
w
it
h
fe
m
a
le
m
a
y
o
rs
(M
V
>
0
)
v
s
m
a
le
m
a
y
o
rs
(M
V
<
0
).
T
h
re
e
d
iff
er
en
t
in
te
rv
a
ls
o
f
M
a
rg
in
o
f
V
ic
to
ry
o
f
th
e
fe
m
a
le
ca
n
d
id
a
te
a
re
co
n
si
d
er
ed
in
th
e
tw
o
-c
a
n
d
id
a
te
s
g
en
d
er
m
ix
ed
ra
ce
s
sa
m
p
le
:
[−
5
;+
5
];
[−
7
.5
;+
7
.5
],
a
n
d
[−
1
0
;+
1
0
].
S
ee
T
a
b
le
7
in
th
e
p
a
p
er
fo
r
th
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
th
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
52
Figure A1: Frequency of Margin of Victory,
Two Candidates Mixed-Gender Races
9090
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
MV female
bin= 5 % bin= 2.5 %
bin= 1 %
Notes. Frequency of two-candidate mixed gender races for term 2001 and 2005. MVit > 0 when the winner
candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality
i and mandate t is male.
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Figure A2: McCrary Test, Two Candidates
Mixed-Gender Races
0
1
2
3
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Notes. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density of our running variable (Margin of
Victory of the female candidate) performed separately on either side of the zero Margin of
Victory threshold. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate
t is female, MVit < 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is
male. (discontinuity estimate: point estimate -0.049 and standard error (0.071)). Optimal
bin-width and bin-size as in McCrary (2008). This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004
municipal elections.
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Figure A3: Placebo Tests for
Corruption, Reelection Outcomes and Campaign Contributions
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Notes. The figure reports the empirical c.d.f. of the t-statistics from a set of rdd estimations
at 580 false thresholds below and above the true threshold at Margin of Victor of the female
candidate equal zero (namely, t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of victory
from -30% to -1% as fake cutoffs and t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of
victory from 1% to 30% as fake cutoffs).
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Figure A4: Placebo Tests for Municipal
Public Employment Outcomes
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Notes. The figure reports the empirical c.d.f. of the t-statistics from a set of rdd estimations
at 580 false thresholds below and above the true threshold at Margin of Victor of the female
candidate equal zero (namely, t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of victory
from -30% to -1% as fake cutoffs and t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of
victory from 1% to 30% as fake cutoffs).
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Figure A5: Placebo Tests for Transfers
for Capital Investments and Health Outcomes
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Notes. The figure reports the empirical c.d.f. of the t-statistics from a set of rdd estimations
at 580 false thresholds below and above the true threshold at Margin of Victor of the female
candidate equal zero (namely, t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of victory
from -30% to -1% as fake cutoffs and t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of
victory from 1% to 30% as fake cutoffs).
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Figure A6: Placebo Tests for Education
and Future Races Outcomes
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Notes. The figure reports the empirical c.d.f. of the t-statistics from a set of rdd estimations
at 580 false thresholds below and above the true threshold at Margin of Victor of the female
candidate equal zero (namely, t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of victory
from -30% to -1% as fake cutoffs and t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of
victory from 1% to 30% as fake cutoffs).
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